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 Abstract 
We find a negative association between a state’s fiscal condition and the use of discretion in 
applying Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules to understate pension 
funding gaps. We also find that the use of discretion is negatively associated with states’ 
decisions to increase taxes and cut spending. In addition, we find that the funding gap 
understatement is positively associated with higher future labor costs. Importantly, this 
association is primarily attributable to the GASB methodology, which systematically understates 
the funding gap. This suggests that the GASB approach is associated with policy choices that 
have the potential to exacerbate fiscal stress. 
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1. Introduction 
With the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, the subsequent recession, and the resulting 
loss of jobs, there has been a heightened interest in the financial outlook of state governments.  
In particular, politicians, voters, capital providers, and regulatory bodies have all focused on 
whether the deterioration in states’ fiscal wellbeing and burgeoning debt balances will affect 
their tax policies and their ability to provide entitlement programs. In this paper, we conjecture 
that politicians will view defaulting on debt, raising taxes, or cutting entitlement programs to be 
costly political responses to fiscal stress, and as a result, politicians will use mechanisms like 
accounting discretion to mask deficits.  We also conjecture that there are economic outcomes 
associated with the use of accounting discretion, as outputs from the accounting system serve as 
inputs into a variety of economic decisions made by governmental entities.  
We focus our analysis on whether states engage in actions to mask the size of pension 
funding gaps and thus reduce the size of pension contributions during periods of fiscal stress and 
whether there are economic outcomes associated with those actions.  Pension obligations are 
among the largest obligations states face, and taking accounting actions to improve the funded 
status of these obligations may reduce a state’s expenditures on pensions and provide states with 
the flexibility to avoid raising taxes or cutting entitlement programs during economic downturns.   
However, using accounting discretion to reduce funding gaps is likely to result in an understated 
cost of labor being reflected in the state’s accounting system. This is particularly important as the 
information that is generated by the states’ accounting system serves as inputs into states’ 
budgets, appropriations, and other control mechanisms.  When an accounting system understates 
the costs associated with pension benefits, states may invest more in labor, as the “true-cost” of 
each worker is not reflected in the decision-maker’s information set.  
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We argue that there are several elements of GASB pension reporting rules that allow 
states to understate their pension funding gaps, and thus lower their annual pension related 
expenditures.
1
  In particular, governmental entities discount future pension benefits using the 
expected investment return on assets held in the pension trust and have the discretion to amortize 
investment gains and losses over future reporting periods.  Jointly, these rules provide financial 
reporting discretion to politicians so they can reduce funding gaps and required contributions to 
the pension fund, which may alleviate budgetary stress and the need to increase taxes and cut 
spending. Thus, the main hypotheses we investigate in the paper are whether states understate 
their pension funding gaps in periods of fiscal stress, whether understated pension funding gaps 
are associated with states’ decisions to engage in mid-year spending cuts and tax increases, and 
whether the extent to which states understate their pension funding gaps is associated with future 
employment costs. 
To provide evidence on these hypotheses, we collect data on the state’s pension 
obligations from two sources: the Public Pension Coordinating Council’s PENDAT Survey of 
State and Local Government Employee Retirement Systems and the Boston College Center for 
Retirement Research for fiscal years from 1990-2009.  We supplement this data by hand 
collecting information for missing plan-years directly from the state’s Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports (CAFRs) and pension plan valuation reports. After accounting for missing 
data, we have 984 state years with pension data.   
                                                             
1  The GASB released new accounting standards for public pension plans in 2012. These standards, GASB 
Statements No. 67 and 68, are effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2013 and June 15, 2014, 
respectively. Because of this timeline, all of our analysis is based on the prior regulatory regime. However, we 
discuss the implications of our results for these new standards in the conclusion.  
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We start our analysis by investigating the relation between the extent to which states 
understate their pension funding gaps and measures of the states’ fiscal condition.2 We develop a 
measure of the extent to which states understate their pension funding gaps by comparing the 
funding gap reported in the state’s accounting records under the GASB’s rules to the funding gap 
they would have reported had they followed the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s 
(FASB) rules. We use the funding gap calculated under the FASB rules as our benchmark 
because it approximates the settlement cost of the pension liability and uses the market value of 
the pension assets. We believe this number more accurately reflects the true size of the funding 
gap. The FASB approach is also consistent with the one advocated by academics (see for 
example, Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011) and adopted by most other developed countries, including 
Canada and many European countries.  
We then decompose the total understatement of the pension funding gap into three 
pieces: the portion that is related to the use of discretion to overestimate the expected return on 
plan assets, the portion that is attributable to the amortization of realized and unrealized 
investment returns, and the portion that reflects differences between the GASB’s and FASB’s 
rules for the selection of the appropriate discount rate. We measure the extent to which a state is 
fiscally stressed using two variables. Our first variable measures the extent to which the state is 
running a budget deficit in the current fiscal year and our second variable measures the extent to 
which a state has reserves to meet any fiscal shortfall.   
We find that the extent to which a state is fiscally stressed is associated with the 
magnitude of the pension funding gap understatement. Specifically, we find that states over 
                                                             
2 We focus on developing a measure of the extent to which states understate their funding gaps, and argue that the 
extent to which states understate their funding gaps will affect the annual expenditures states make for their pension 
obligations. As we discuss below, understated funding gaps can reduce expenditures for both the normal and 
amortization components of the Annual Required Contributions (ARC) for a state pension plan. 
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estimate the expected return on plan assets to a greater extent during periods when they are 
running budget deficits and when they have a relatively smaller cushion in their general fund 
balances.  A higher expected return on assets will produce a lower pension liability, and hence a 
lower funding gap. These results suggest that states use the discretion allowed under the GASB 
rules to understate the funding gap when they are financially constrained.  We also find that 
states overestimate the expected return on plan assets during periods in which the governor is in 
a relatively more competitive election and during periods in which the state issues debt. These 
results are consistent with findings in prior studies that states have incentives to manipulate the 
outputs of the accounting system to influence the outcomes of elections (Kido et al., 2012) and to 
influence debt costs (Baber and Gore, 2008). We do not find any evidence that states 
opportunistically set the amortization period for investment gains and losses to influence 
elections, reduce debt costs, or to inflate fiscal performance.      
Our first set of tests provides indirect evidence that states manipulate their funding gaps 
to avoid raising taxes or cutting expenditures.  Our second set of tests examines this question 
more directly by investigating whether the accounting discretion states use to understate their 
funding gaps reduces the extent to which fiscal stress is associated with states’ decisions to raise 
taxes or cut expenditures. Consistent with our expectation, we find that states that overestimate 
the expected return on plan assets to a greater extent are less likely to engage in midyear tax 
increases and midyear expenditure cuts when they face fiscal stress.  These results suggest that 
using accounting discretion to understate pension funding gaps can reduce the extent to which 
states have to engage in other more politically costly actions like increasing taxes or cutting 
expenditures in response to financial difficulties.  
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We conclude our paper by investigating whether there is a relation between states’ future 
payroll costs and the extent to which states understate their pension funding gaps. In this analysis 
we model future payroll costs to be a function of the reported funding gap, the unreported 
funding gap, and various control variables for the demand for public service and the state’s 
economic condition.  The reported funding gap is obtained from the financial statements 
prepared under the GASB rules. The unreported funding gap is equal to the understatement 
calculated as we describe above.  We measure states’ future payroll costs over a one, three, and 
five-year horizon from the year the state sets its pension assumptions. We find a weak, positive 
relation between the expenditures on state payrolls in year T+1 and the reported pension funding 
gaps in year T. However, as we move out in time to year T+3 and year T+5, we find that this 
relation becomes insignificant.  These results suggest that states with larger reported pension 
funding gaps tend to spend more on employment in the short term. However, over time, states 
respond to the reported funding gaps and reduce spending on their employment.  
We also find a positive relation between the expenditures on state payrolls in year T+1 
and the unreported pension funding gaps in year T. However, unlike our tests of the reported 
funding gap, we find that the relation between the unreported funding gap and payroll persists 
three and five years into the future.  These results suggest that by not reporting the true economic 
costs of pension obligations, states tend to spend more on labor both in the short and long terms. 
In addition, we find that this positive relation is attributable to the understatement related to the 
design of the GASB rules and the results are robust to a change specification. Overall, these 
findings highlight that discretionary actions under the GASB rules, like distorting expected rates 
of returns on assets or choosing inappropriate investment smoothing horizons, are relatively 
transparent, and thus do not affect employment decisions.  In contrast, the non-discretionary 
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portion of the funding gap understatement masks the true cost of each employee and government 
officials do not (or cannot) undo the understatement in their hiring decisions.  
Our findings extend the literature on public pensions. The debate on public pensions is 
driven by the concern that states use a discount rate that is too large.  As a result, states 
understate their pension funding gaps, resulting in insufficient current contributions, and hence 
an unfair shifting of the cost of these plans to future generations. We find that states are more 
likely to understate pension funding gaps during periods of fiscal stress. We also find that 
funding gap understatements are associated with a reduced likelihood of tax increases and 
expenditure cuts during periods of fiscal stress, and that these understatements are associated 
with future increases in payroll expenditures. Importantly, the increases in payroll expenditures 
appear related to the inherent design of the GASB’s rules. Therefore, it is not only the case that 
the current GASB regime poses intergenerational fairness issues (by not requiring sufficient 
pension contributions), but also that it is associated with policy choices (such as increased labor 
expenditures) that have the potential to exacerbate public sector fiscal stress. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on financial 
reporting for public pension plans and Section 3 develops the hypothesis. Section 4 discusses our 
research design and Section 5 describes our sample. Section 6 presents our empirical findings 
and Section 7 concludes.   
2. Background  
2.1 GASB’s Pension Accounting Rules 
During the period of our study the financial reporting rules for pension plans of 
governmental entities were codified under GASB Statement No. 25, Financial Reporting for 
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Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Note Disclosures for Defined Contribution Plans, and GASB 
Statement No. 27, Accounting for Pensions by State and Local Governmental Employers. These 
rules define how states determine the discount rate used in calculating the present value of their 
pension obligations and the methods states use to determine the values of the assets that are 
being held to satisfy these obligations.   
The GASB rules recommend that future pension benefits be discounted at a rate equal to 
the expected investment return on the plan’s current and future assets.3 Thus states have the 
ability to assume artificially high expected rates of return on plan assets, which will reduce the 
size of their pension liabilities, resulting in smaller pension funding gaps and potentially smaller 
pension contributions.
4
 The GASB rules also allow states to amortize realized and unrealized 
investment gains and losses on the assets held in the pension trust over future reporting periods.
5
 
Thus, states can change the amortization periods to increase the value of the pension assets, and 
reduce the size of any funding gaps and potentially reduce the size of their pension 
contributions.
6
   
By providing states with the flexibility to both reduce the size of their pension funding 
gaps and pension contributions, the GASB also provides states with the ability to use this 
accounting discretion to avoid having to enact tax increases or cut spending in times of fiscal 
                                                             
3 GASB 25, paragraph 36c “… the investment return assumption (discount rate) should be based on an estimated 
long-term investment yield for the plan, with consideration given to the nature and mix of current and expected plan 
investment ….” 
4 GASB 27 establishes rules for calculating the Annual Required Contributions (ARC) for governmental pensions. 
The ARC has two components (1) the normal cost, which is the present value of pension plan benefits accrued for 
the current year, and (2) a provision for amortizing any funding gap (or unfunded actuarial accrued liability) over a 
period of not more than 30 years. Changing pension assumptions affects both the calculation of normal cost and the 
amortization of the funding gap. Thus changing pension assumptions can reduce states’ expenditures for their 
pension contribution. 
5 GASB 25, paragraph 140 “…the valuation of assets generally should reflect some function of market value, a term 
that includes both current market values and values produced by techniques that smooth the effects of short-term 
volatility in market values.” “…, the Board has not placed constraints on the kinds of smoothing techniques or the 
length of smoothing periods used in the actuarial valuation of assets.” 
6 For example, California chose to amortize the investment losses for fiscal 2007 over a longer amortization period 
than it had used prior to that time, thus leading to a higher actuarial value of assets starting with its 2008 fiscal year.  
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distress.  For example, in fiscal 2008 the California Public Employee’s Retirement Fund (PERF) 
had a funding gap of approximately $35 billion, with a reported pension liability of $268 billion 
and an actuarial value of assets of $233 billion. The Annual Required Contribution (ARC) was 
approximately $7.2 billion, which consists of a normal cost component of $5.0 billion, and an 
amortization component of $2.2 billion. The reported discount rate was 7.75%. Increasing this 
discount rate by an additional 25 basis points would decrease the funding gap by $10.7 billion.
7
  
It would also reduce California’s ARC for their pensions in 2008 by approximately $790 million.  
Specifically, the normal cost component of the ARC would be reduced by approximately $254 
million
8
, and the amortization component would be reduced by approximately $536 million.
9
 
The deficit reported by California for this fiscal year was only $412 million. Thus, if California 
had increased its discount rate by 25 basis points, it would have been sufficient to eliminate the 
deficit entirely.
10
 
2.2 Comparing the GASB’s to the FASB’s Pension Accounting Rules 
 The methodology outlined under GASB 25 and 27 is in direct contrast to the 
methodology required under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 87, 
Employers’ Accounting for Pensions. SFAS 87 requires that future benefit payments be 
                                                             
7 The duration of the plan is about 17 years. Therefore, a 25 basis point increase in the discount rate would decrease 
the total pension liability by 4% (=1.170.25-1), or $10.7 billion (4% x $268 billion). Since the plan is underfunded, 
the funding gap would also decrease by $10.7 billion. 
8 Since the normal cost is the liability accrued by active participants during the current year, we use the duration of 
the pension plan for active members (22 years) to generate this estimate. A 25 basis point increase in the discount 
rate would decrease the pension liability for the active participants by 5.1% (=1.220.25-1). Since the normal cost is 
the liability accrued by active participants during the current year, the decrease in the normal cost due to a 25 basis 
point reduction in the discount rate is also 5.1%, or $254 million (5.1% x $5.0 billion). 
9 Since the California PERF amortizes the funding gap resulting from changes in actuarial assumptions over 20 
years, the decrease in ARC is $10.7 billion/20 = $536 million. 
10 The California example reported above is not unique in our sample. Over the 2001-2009 period (i.e. the time 
period for which we have pension contribution information), the pension contribution was approximately 9% of total 
general fund expenditures. During this period there were 237 state-years in which a deficit was reported.  The 
pension contribution was on average 6.1 times the size of the deficit. Therefore, a reduction in the pension 
contribution of 11% (i.e., $790/$7,200, which is the percentage decrease calculated above for the California 
example) would, on average, eliminate approximately two-thirds of the reported deficit (i.e., 6.1 x 11%). 
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discounted using an interest rate that reflects the rate at which the obligation to pay the pension 
benefits can be settled rather than the expected investment return on the pension assets.
11
 In 
seeking these rates, the rule further suggests employers look to “rates of return on high-quality 
fixed-income investments currently available and expected to be available during the period to 
maturity of the pension benefits.” In practice, companies in the U.S. typically use zero-coupon 
duration-matched Aa corporate bond rates to determine their pension liability for financial 
reporting purposes. Using an Aa rate provides an estimate of the cost of extinguishing the 
pension liability through the purchase of an annuity contract from a highly rated insurance 
company. 
The FASB and GASB advocate two different approaches to calculating pension liabilities 
in part because there are inherent differences between for-profit and governmental entities, and 
there are inherent differences in the role of accounting information and the financial reporting 
process in these organizations.  The FASB’s approach is designed to provide an estimate of the 
cost of settling the obligation to pay pension benefits through the purchase of an annuity 
contract. In contrast, the GASB’s approach supports a pension liability calculation that is 
primarily useful in setting a reasonable contribution schedule, and allows the use of amortization 
schedules in the determination of pension assets that mitigate the volatility in annual contribution 
requirements. Because of this, the GASB approach does not provide an accurate reflection of the 
settlement cost of the pension liability. 
                                                             
11 SFAS 87, paragraph 44 “Assumed discount rates shall reflect the rates at which the pension benefits could be 
effectively settled.” Additional discount rate guidance is provided by the SEC in EITF Topic No. D-36, which 
states: “The objective of selecting assumed discount rates is to measure the single amount that, if invested at the 
measurement date in a portfolio of high-quality debt instruments, would provide the necessary future cash flows to 
pay the benefit obligation when due.  Notionally, that single amount . . . would equal the current market value of a 
portfolio of high-quality zero coupon bonds.” 
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We suggest that the FASB settlement cost approach provides a more accurate reflection 
of the “true costs” of retirement benefits, consistent with others (e.g., Novy-Marx and Rauh, 
2011). Therefore, we compare the funding gap calculated under the FASB’s rules to the funding 
gap calculated under the GASB’s rules to derive a measure of the extent to which states’ pension 
funding gaps are understated. We then decompose this understatement to obtain measures of the 
discretion used by states to influence their accounting reports and the extent to which pension 
understatements are an artifact of the GASB’s rules.  We focus on two discretionary elements 
under GASB rules:  the choice of expected returns on assets, and the amortization of realized and 
unrealized returns on plan assets.
12
 After isolating these two discretionary portions of the 
understatement of the funding gap, we categorize the remainder of the understatement to be 
driven by the GASB’s rules. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
 We begin our analysis by examining the incentives states have to understate their pension 
funding gaps.  Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggest that in the for-profit sector there are a 
variety of different motivations (like debt, compensation contracts, and political forces) that 
influence the accounting choices made by firms.  In the accounting literature, there are 
significantly fewer theoretical underpinnings for the factors affecting the accounting choices 
made by governmental entities. In the political science literature, Stiglitz (2002) highlights the 
tension underlying a government’s incentives to be transparent, arguing that “Democratic 
societies have a strong presumption in favor of transparency and openness in government.  But 
                                                             
12 The main reason why we view the amortization of realized and unrealized returns on plan assets as discretionary 
is because it is something that the GASB rules allow rather than require. The GASB rule allows states to recognize 
all gains and losses immediately, or to amortize these gains and losses over extended periods (and even change these 
periods when the losses are particularly large). Therefore, while the rules allow many choices, the specific choice is 
at the discretion of the state. 
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there has also long been recognition that on their own, governments and their leaders do not have 
the incentives to disclose, let alone disseminate, information that is contrary to their interests.” 
Consistent with this idea, we suggest that elected officials will have the strongest 
motivation to obfuscate the true size of their pension funding gaps during periods in which they 
face fiscal stress.  By understating their pension funding gap during periods of fiscal stress, states 
reduce their Annual Required Contributions to the pension fund, and thus can reduce their 
expenditures on pension obligations.
13
  Virtually every state has some form of balanced budget 
restriction, which requires a balancing of expenditures and revenues.  Thus, in periods when 
revenues fall below expenditures, or in periods when there are relatively fewer funds available to 
meet budget shortfalls, states have incentives to use accounting discretion to reduce their pension 
obligations and thus reduce required contributions to pension trusts. Thus our first hypothesis is: 
H1: The extent to which a state understates its pension funding gap is associated with 
the extent to which the state is experiencing fiscal stress.  
 
Budget shortfalls are likely to be of particular importance to state politicians, because 
absent accounting manipulations, balanced budget provisions will force states to either cut 
expenditures or increase taxes when there is an unexpected shock to revenues or expenses.  Since 
both of these alternatives are likely to be viewed negatively by voters, we suggest that politicians 
have incentives to resort to accounting manipulations in lieu of real tax or expenditure changes. 
This idea is consistent with Gold (1983) who states that “a state … usually has considerable 
latitude to accelerate tax collections, defer outlays, and adopt accounting practices which avert a 
deficit.” Understating pension obligations will bring immediate budget relief by reducing 
                                                             
13 Reducing the ARC will, in general, reduce state expenditures for pension obligations but this is not necessarily 
always the case. For the 2001-2009 fiscal years (a period in which we have the data on ARC), we find that the ARC 
is 95% correlated with the actual contribution made by states to their pensions. Thus for most states, reducing the 
ARC will lead to reduced funding, but in some states this will not be true, which should bias against finding results. 
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required contributions to the pension trust and thus reduce the need to increase taxes or cut 
expenditures.  Thus we predict that:  
H2: The extent to which a state engages in mid-year expenditure cuts as a response to 
fiscal stress is negatively associated with the extent to which the state understates its 
pension funding gap.  
 
H3: The extent to which a state engages in mid-year tax increases as a response to 
fiscal stress is negatively associated with the extent to which the state understates its 
pension funding gap.  
 
We further conjecture that the understatement of pension funding gaps may affect future 
state hiring through the following two mechanisms. First, a state’s accounting system is a central 
source of information that is likely to be used in a variety of different settings, including the 
setting of appropriations and the setting of the annual budget.  When states underestimate 
pension funding gaps, they distort this information system so that it reflects relatively lower 
labor costs, which may result in states spending more on labor.  For example, in its centralized 
budgeting process, Massachusetts derives a fully burdened rate for employees, which includes 
pension costs for the employees’ retirement.14  This information is then used to estimate the cost 
of hiring additional workers. As a result, the pension costs recorded in the state’s accounting 
system can have a direct impact on its investments in labor. Second, understating pension 
obligations and funding gaps allows governments to reduce required contributions and makes 
more funds available for spending on employment. The effect of pension costs on public sector 
budgets and employment is widely acknowledged in the press, especially due to the recent surge 
in state and local pension costs.
15
  
                                                             
14  See http://www.mass.gov/anf/budget-taxes-and-procurement/admin-bulletins/fringe-benefits-payroll-taxes-and-
indirect.html, which states in part that “Department heads are responsible for budgeting these [fringe benefit] costs 
from the applicable funds.” The fringe benefit cost for retirement plans for 2010 was 6.16%.  
15 For example, in his 2013 testimony, New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg stated that due to rising 
pension costs, local governments are starting to reduce the hiring of police, firefighters, and teachers. See 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/13-pensions-states-gordon 
 13 
The association between the pension funding gap understatement and state payroll 
expenditures depends on how the GASB information is used in employee hiring and 
compensation decisions. On the one hand, if the GASB information is used without any 
adjustments for understatements, employee costs will be underestimated and this can lead to 
increased hiring or payroll commitments.
16
 Under this view, the funding gap understatement is 
likely to result in larger accumulated employee cost over potentially long periods. On the other 
hand, the existence of significant pension obligation understatements due to the GASB reporting 
methodology has been widely acknowledged in both the financial press and in academic work. 
For example, a report published by Moody’s finds that when more appropriate discount rates are 
used to value public pension liabilities, “the 50 states have, in aggregate, just 48 cents for every 
dollar in pensions they have promised.
17” Under this view, the understatements of funding gaps 
are transparent and should be unrelated to payroll expenditures. This leads to our fourth 
hypothesis (stated in alternative form): 
H4: The extent to which a state understates its pension funding gap is associated with 
its future payroll expenditures.  
 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Estimation of pension funding gap understatement 
We calculate the total funding gap understatement (TTL_UNDSTMT) as the difference 
between the estimated funding gap under an unbiased application of FASB rules and the reported 
funding gap under the GASB rules. We estimate the FASB funding gap by taking the difference 
                                                             
16 For example, in 2002 San Francisco increased its employee costs by 7.5% because it incorrectly believed that its 
pension program was overfunded based on the GASB financial data. See 
http://www.publicsectorinc.com/psi_articles/2010/12/unrealistic-pension-accounting-rules-covering-a-multitude-of-
shortfalls.html 
17 See http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/moodys-shows-wider-pension-gap-for-states/?_r=0 
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between the estimated pension liabilities discounted at the Treasury yield and the market value of 
the pension assets.
18
 The reported funding gap is the difference between the reported pension 
liabilities and the actuarial value of assets as reported by the state under GASB. A funding gap is 
understated if the estimated FASB funding gap is larger than the reported funding gap. We then 
decompose TTL_UNDSTMT into three components: the understatement of the funding gap due 
to the use of discretion in estimating expected returns on plan assets (LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC), 
the understatement (overstatement) of the funding gap due to the overstatement (understatement) 
of assets by amortizing realized and unrealized returns on plan assets (ASSET_OVSTMT), and 
the remainder of the understatement that is due to the design of the GASB rule 
(LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE). Figure 1 depicts graphically the composition of the 
TTL_UNDSTMT. 
The first element, LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC, is the understatement of pension liabilities 
resulting from the difference between what a state used for its discount rate and what the rate 
would be if the state followed an unbiased application of the GASB rules. GASB allows broad 
discretion in setting discount rates, and states often use this discretion to set high discount rates 
and understate their pension liabilities.
19
 We measure the discretion associated with setting 
abnormally large expected returns on assets (i.e. high discount rates) by estimating a “discretion-
free discount rate” that is a function of the assets held in the pension trust.  We estimate the 
                                                             
18 As noted earlier, FASB guidance requires corporate pension plan sponsors to use zero-coupon duration matched 
Aa corporate bond rates to discount promised pension benefits, as a liability calculated using this rate approximates 
the settlement cost of the pension benefits. For public pension plans, there is some debate as to the appropriate 
discount rate for the purposes of estimating the settlement cost because the guarantees on public pensions are 
different from those on corporate pensions. For example, one could argue that public pensions are guaranteed by the 
state which would suggest that the state general obligation (GO) bond yield is the appropriate discount rate, or that 
the federal government is the ultimate guarantor which would suggest that the Treasury yield is the appropriate 
discount rate. Our use of the Treasury yields follows Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011). 
19 For example, California used discount rates that exceeded the actuary’s recommendation for several of the most 
recent years. Similarly, Massachusetts uses a rate that is set by the legislature, and that is noted by the state’s actuary 
as being higher than his recommendation in recent years. 
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discretion-free discount rate by multiplying the percent of pension assets allocated to each broad 
asset class by the long-term expected investment return on that asset class. This methodology is 
generally referred to as the building block approach in pension accounting guidelines, and it is 
the most common method that pension plan sponsors use to estimate the expected investment 
return on pension assets.
20
  
To ensure consistency across states, we use five different asset categories: equity, fixed 
income, real estate, cash and short-term investment, and other.
 21
 We assign each asset class with 
long-term expected returns of 8%, 5%, 6%, 1% and 9%, respectively.
22
 These return assumptions 
were gathered from a report prepared in 2005 by Hewitt Associates, an independent global 
benefit consulting company.
23
 Prior studies that examine expected investment returns on pension 
assets have generally focused on whether higher assumptions are tied to higher equity allocations 
(e.g. Amir and Benartzi, 1998). Our methodology is an extension of this approach. This 
methodology requires a set of unbiased anticipated returns for each asset category. Because we 
do not have access to these unbiased anticipated returns by asset class for each year, the 
estimated expected return on assets only changes due to changes in asset allocations, and not due 
to the passage of time. However, since these anticipated returns are long-term, they should have 
small variation over time.
24
 Moreover, we include year fixed effects in all of our specifications, 
                                                             
20 A report entitled “Establishment of Discount Rate Assumption for the PERF”, produced by the Actuarial Office of 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and available online at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-
docs/about/board-cal-agenda/agendas/bpac/201103/item7a-0.pdf illustrates the connection between asset allocations 
and the discount rate under the building block approach as implemented by CalPERS. 
21 The “other” category usually includes specialized high return investment vehicles, such as hedge funds and 
private equity.  
22 For example, for a state with 60% equity, 30% bond and 10% real estate, we would estimate the discretion free 
GASB discount rate to be 6.9%. 
23  Hewitt Associates started preparing such reports in 2003 in response to updated accounting guidelines for 
corporate plans. These reports are not publicly available. However, a similar report, prepared by Pension Consulting 
Alliance, Inc. (PCA) for 2012, is available online at 
http://www.pensionconsulting.com/pdfdocs/2012_PCA_Asset_Class_Assumptions_Report.pdf 
24 A private conversation with a state’s actuary confirms that the expected returns on plan assets are usually over 
30+ years, and therefore, there is very little variation over time.   
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which reduce the influence of not allowing for inter-temporal variation. In robustness tests, we 
use an alternative measure based on the average expected return assumption for corporate 
pension plans to allow for inter-temporal differences in the expected investment return 
assumptions. The results of these tests are similar to those reported in the paper.   
The second element of our decomposition, ASSET_OVSTMT, is equal to the difference 
between the smoothed value of pension assets used in the actuarial valuation and the market 
value of pension assets. The GASB rules, which allow for the amortization of investment gains 
and losses over time, provide states with the ability to change amortization approaches to provide 
immediate budget relief. We note that these discretionary changes are usually confined to periods 
immediately following a significant stock market boom or decline
25
, and thus are likely to have 
the most impact during periods of fiscal distress or wellbeing.  
The final element, LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE, is equal to the difference between our 
estimate of the discretion-free pension liability and the pension liability calculated using the 
Treasury yields. Using the Treasury yields to discount the pension liability is reasonable in that 
promised pension benefits are protected by state constitutions and it is legally difficult (if not 
impossible) to break this promise. However, in robustness tests, we investigate whether our 
results are sensitive to the use of either Aa corporate bond rates or state general obligation (GO) 
bond yields as alternative discount rates. To calculate the appropriate rate for each plan, we 
                                                             
25 For example, New Jersey abandoned its practice of "smoothing" asset returns and revalued assets at their market 
values as of June 30, 1999, at close to the peak of the technology bubble. This resulted in a significant reduction in 
the budgeted cost of the pension plan for the following fiscal year. Similarly, following the recent recession, 
California decided to amortize the losses associated with 2007 over an extended period, thus reducing the budgeted 
pension cost in the years immediately following the market downturn. 
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match the discount rate to the duration of the pension plan.
26
 When we cannot find a perfect 
match, we interpolate the yields between the two closest maturities.
27
  
4.2 Pension funding gap understatement and fiscal stress 
We examine whether states use the discretion available under the GASB rules to mitigate 
fiscal problems using the following specifications: 
PENSION_UNDSTMTt-1 = αt + γi + β1DEFICITt + β2SURPLUSt + β3TTLBAL_RATIOt + 
β4ISSUE_STDt + β5ISSUE_LTDt + β6ELECTIONt + 
β7ELECTIONt*COMPt + ΘCONTROLSt + εt  (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the three components of the total understatement of pension 
funding gaps (i.e. LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC, LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE, ASSET_OVSTMT). 
We exclude 8 states that have both a biennial legislative cycle and biennial budgetary cycle from 
this analysis as prior research finds that those states do not respond in a timely manner to state 
fiscal conditions (Clemens and Miran, 2012).
28
 We cluster standard errors by state and by year to 
correct for possible correlations across observations of a given state and of a given year 
(Petersen, 2009).  
Equation (1) uses the understatement of the funding gap from the prior period as the 
dependent variable because the actuarial valuation performed during year t determines the 
reported funding gap (and any understatement of the funding gap) for year t-1. Take the 
Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System (SERS) as an example. Pennsylvania SERS 
                                                             
26 We summarize the estimation of the duration for each plan in Appendix A. 
27 For example, Alabama ERS in fiscal year 2001 has an estimated duration of 18.5 years and the plan’s actuarial 
valuation date is September 30. The 10 year Treasury yield on September 30, 2001 is 4.73% and the 20 year 
Treasury yield is 5.53%. The treasury does not have 18.5 year maturity yield. We interpolate between the 10 year 
maturity yield and the 20 year maturity yield to calculate the yield for 18.5 years. The interpolated yield is 5.41%.  
28 The 8 states we exclude are: Arkansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, and 
Texas. This list follows Clemens and Miran (2012), who analyze how states respond to deficit shocks. They find that 
only states with annual budgetary cycles, or states with biennial budgetary cycles and annual legislative cycles, 
respond to changes in the state’s fiscal condition in a timely manner. Consistent with Clemens and Miran (2012), we 
find that including the 8 states in which both budgetary and legislative cycles are biennial in equation (1) 
significantly weakens our results.  
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has a fiscal year end date on June 30
th
. Assume year t is the fiscal year ending on 6/30/2009. The 
actuarial report for the fiscal year ending on 6/30/2008 (year t-1) was prepared using participant 
data gathered and provided to the actuary between 7/1/2008 and 6/30/2009 (year t) and using 
assumptions set between 7/1/2008 and 6/30/2009 (year t). For example, the SERS Board set the 
expected return on assets assumption on April 29, 2009 and Pennsylvania SERS issued its 2008 
actuarial report on June 3, 2009. 
We use two variables to measure a state’s fiscal condition. The first variable captures the 
extent to which a state is running a deficit in the current fiscal year without any midyear 
adjustments. Specifically, we calculate EXP_MINUS_REV as the difference between final 
expenditures and final revenues in the general fund and then we add back any midyear spending 
cuts or tax changes. We undo these midyear adjustments to uncover the true fiscal condition of 
the state.
29
 When expenditures exceed (are less than) revenues, the state is running a deficit 
(surplus). Since states may have different incentives to manipulate pension accounting when they 
are running deficits versus surpluses, we create separate variables for each. Specifically, 
DEFICIT (SURPLUS) equals EXP_MINUS_REV if the variable is positive (negative) and zero 
otherwise.  
Our second variable captures the extent to which a state has reserves to cover any 
unexpected budget shortfalls. TTLBAL_RATIO is the ratio of total balance to expenditures in 
the general fund. Total balances are the sum of the general fund balances and the state’s budget 
stabilization fund balances (i.e., rainy day fund balances). Total balances represent the cushion a 
                                                             
29 Failure to undo the midyear adjustments obscures the true fiscal condition of the state. For example, assume 
during the fiscal year the governor learns that due to revenue shortfalls, expenditures are expected to exceed 
revenues by $1 million. To prevent the state from running a deficit, the governor carries out midyear spending cuts 
of $1.5 million, resulting in a final surplus of $0.5 million. Without undoing the midyear adjustment, we would 
incorrectly conclude that the state is doing well in the fiscal year. See more discussion on the importance of this 
adjustment in Poterba (1994).  
 19 
state has when facing unexpected deficit shocks. Scaled measures of total balances are 
commonly used to evaluate government fiscal condition.
30
 The higher the ratio, the better the 
fiscal condition.  
Our remaining control variables account for non-fiscal incentives that may be associated 
with a state’s decision to understate its pension funding gap. Baber and Gore (2008) find that 
governments’ financial reporting is related to their cost of debt. If a state heavily relies on debt 
financing, it may have more incentives to understate the funding gap to lower the cost of debt 
capital. ISSUE_STD is the per capita short-term debt issued during the year and ISSUE_LTD is 
the per capita long-term debt issued during the year. Kido et al. (2012) find that state 
governments tend to understate their liabilities during an election year. ELECTION is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the year is a gubernatorial election year, and 0 otherwise. We further expect 
that state government’s incentive to manipulate their pension is greater if the election is more 
competitive. Therefore, we allow ELECTION to vary based on the level of competition by 
including the interaction term, ELECTION*COMP, where COMP is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the election is competitive, and 0 otherwise.
31
  
4.3 Pension funding gap understatement and midyear fiscal adjustments 
We examine whether states use the discretion available under the GASB rules to reduce 
the likelihood of a midyear spending cut or tax increase using the following logit specification: 
Pr(Midyear Adjustmentt) = αt + γi + β1DEFICITt + β2SURPLUSt + β3TTLBAL_RATIOt + 
β4DEFICITt*PENSION_UNDSTMTt-1 + 
β5SURPLUSt*PENSION_UNDSTMTt-1 + 
β6TTLBAL_RATIOt*PENSION_UNDSTMTt-1 + 
β7PENSION_ UNDSTMTt-1 + ΘCONTROLSt + εt (2) 
 
                                                             
30 For example, the National Association of State Budget Officer’s Fiscal Survey of States suggests that a state is 
considered to be in good fiscal health if its total fund balances are greater than 5% of its general fund expenditures.  
31 We consider a gubernatorial election competitive if the vote for the winning candidate is between 48% and 52%. 
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where the dependent variable equals 1 if the state enforces midyear adjustments such as tax 
increases (DTAXINCREASE) or spending cuts (DSPENDCUT) in response to the fiscal stress. 
PENSION_UNSTMT is the three components of the total understatement of pension funding 
gaps (i.e. LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC, LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE, ASSET_OVSTMT). As with 
equation (1), we exclude 8 states that have both a biennial legislative cycle and biennial 
budgetary cycle and we cluster standard errors by state and by year.  
We estimate equation (2) using a logit model because we are investigating whether tax 
increases and spending cuts can be avoided through the use of the discretion available under the 
GASB accounting rules. In robustness tests, we re-estimate equation (2) using an OLS model to 
investigate whether pension discretion reduces the magnitude of the spending or tax change. We 
recognize that equation (2) suffers from an endogeneity problem, because a state’s decisions to 
increase tax, cut spending, and exercise discretion in pension assumptions in times of fiscal stress 
are jointly determined. To identify the causal effect of pension discretion on midyear fiscal 
adjustments, we would need at least 3 instruments (or exogenous shocks) and to jointly model 
these choices in a structural equation. We are unable to identify these instruments. Therefore, the 
results of equation (2) are association tests, not tests of causality.   
We follow the labor economics literature (e.g., Matsusaka, 2009) and include a set of 
standard control variables that may affect state-level demand for government services. We also 
control for the actual funding status of the pension plan, because a funding deficit is likely to 
affect the state’s decision to raise tax or cut spending. We discuss these variables in more detail 
in the following section. 
4.4 Pension funding gap understatement and future labor costs  
 21 
We test the association between the pension funding gap understatement and future labor 
cost using the following specification: 
PAYROLLt+n = αt + γi + α1GASB_FUNDGAPt + α2PENSION_UNDSTMTt + 
ΘCONTROLSt+n + εt+n      (3) 
 
where the dependent variable is 1, 3, and 5 year ahead per capita payroll expenditure. We 
measure PENSION_UNDSTMT using its three components (LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC, 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE, ASSET_OVSTMT) to investigate which component, if any, is 
associated with future labor costs. GASB_FUNDGAP is the per capita reported pension liability 
minus the per capita reported actuarial value of assets. We include this variable to control for the 
effect of actual reported funded status of the pension plan on employee hiring. Since this analysis 
does not focus on how states respond to fiscal stress, we include all 50 states in the analysis.
32
 
 Our hypothesis predicts a positive association between future labor cost and pension 
funding gap understatement (α2 > 0). This positive association could arise because state officials 
do not internalize the true cost of their employees, or because lower pension contributions free 
up funds for spending on employment. We acknowledge that equation (3) cannot fully 
distinguish between the two alternatives.
33
 However, the source of the association may provide 
evidence as to which alternative is the most likely explanation. More specifically, if the positive 
association is attributable to the rule related understatement (i.e., LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE), 
this is consistent with state officials not fully understanding accounting information and 
investing more in labor. In contrast, if the positive association is attributable to the discretion 
related understatement (i.e., LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC or ASSET_OVSTMT), this is consistent 
                                                             
32 Excluding the 8 states that have both a biennial legislative cycle and biennial budgetary cycle does not affect our 
results. 
33  There are limited studies investigating the mechanisms through which accounting information affects real 
decisions. One exception is Shroff (2012), who finds that changes in accounting rules affect corporate investment 
decisions through changes in debt covenant slack and changes in managers’ information sets.  
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with officials freeing up funds for employment spending through opportunistic reporting choices. 
In addition, by controlling for the reported funding gap, we capture any future payroll costs that 
are generated by providing smaller contributions. 
We include a set of conventional control variables that may affect the demand for public 
services (Matsusaka, 2009). LnPI is the natural logarithm of state personal income per capita. 
POVERTY is the percentage poverty rate. DENSITY is population density defined as the 
number of residents per square mile. POPULATION is state population in thousands. We also 
control for state fiscal conditions using TTLBAL, the per capita total fund balance.  
We include state fixed effects γi in all our tests (equations (1)-(3)). Therefore, our 
empirical approach exploits variation within the same state over time to account for unobserved 
state-specific factors that do not vary over time. This design allows cleaner identification of the 
impact of pension understatement on state policies. We also include year fixed effects αt to 
capture omitted variables, such as general macroeconomic conditions, that are correlated with 
time. To reduce the effect of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the top and bottom 
1 percentiles. Appendix B lists detailed definitions of variables.  
5. Sample Selection 
We use multiple public data sources to construct our sample. We collect state sponsored 
defined benefit pension plan data from PENDAT Survey of State and Local Government 
Employee Retirement Systems, conducted by the Public Pension Coordinating Council, and from 
the Boston College Center for Retirement Research. The PENDAT pension plan data covers the 
1990 through 2000 fiscal years and the Boston College data covers the 2001 though 2009 fiscal 
years. We crosscheck these data using the information from the National Association of State 
Retirement Administrators. When there were discrepancies between our data sources or there 
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was missing information
34
, we collect the necessary information directly from the 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) and pension plan valuation reports. We also 
collect each plan’s valuation reports and CAFRs to obtain the information on the early retirement 
provisions and demographics of both the inactive and active participants to implement our 
duration estimation procedure outlined in Appendix A. We have 106 plans that have the 
information necessary to calculate funding gap understatement. After aggregating these plans to 
the state level, we have 984 state-year observations.
35
 
We obtain monthly Treasury yield curves from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. The 30-year Treasury yields were discontinued between February 2002 and 
February 2006. For this period, we estimate the 30-year Treasury yields using the adjusting 
factor published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. We match each plan’s actuarial 
valuation date to the most recently published Treasury yields prior to the valuation date. We 
collect state governments’ financial data from Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Governments 
and National Association of State Budget Officer’s (NASBO) fiscal survey of states. The 
NASBO fiscal survey also provides information on enacted tax changes, midyear spending cuts, 
and the general fund budgets. We collect these data to construct the proxies for state fiscal 
conditions. We collect state employment data from the Census of Government Employment. The 
Census Bureau changed the base reporting period for measuring government employment and 
payrolls in 1996, and therefore we do not have employment related data in 1996. We collect a 
state’s personal income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and a state’s population data 
                                                             
34 Data was often missing from the PENDAT survey. This occurred because the survey was optional, and therefore 
not every public retirement system provided the information each year.  
35 47 states have 20 years of data (i.e. data for our full sample period). Maine and Tennessee have 14 years and West 
Virginia has 16 years of data. The missing data, which we are unable to obtain through CAFRs or valuation reports, 
are all in the early 1990s. 
 24 
from the U.S. Census Bureau. We collect the size of the state in square miles from the American 
Community Survey by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the average of each state’s pension liabilities and pension assets during 
the fiscal years 1990-2009 (in $billions). Column [1] shows the reported pension liability, 
column [2] shows the estimated pension liability discounted at the discretion-free GASB rate, 
column [3] shows the estimated pension liability discounted at the Treasury yield, column [4] 
shows the actuarial value of assets, and column [5] shows the market value of assets. The 
pension liabilities increase as we move from column [1] to column [3] as the discount rate is 
typically reduced. During the sample period, the average reported discount rate is 8%, the 
average estimated discretion free discount rate is 6.8%, and the average Treasury yield is 5.9% 
(see Table 2).  
The aggregate reported pension liabilities for state governments average approximately 
$1.77 trillion per year during the sample period. This number increases to $2.12 trillion when we 
measure the pension liability using the discretion-free GASB discount rate and to $2.68 trillion 
when we use Treasury yields.
36
 California has the largest pension liability. Its reported pension 
liability averages $272 billion ($7,915 per capita) per year during the sample period. However, 
this amount soars to $412 billion ($11,890 per capita) discounted using the Treasury yields. The 
reported pension liability represents 32% of California’s average GDP during the sample period. 
The next three states with the largest reported pension liabilities are New York, Ohio, and Texas. 
                                                             
36 These liability numbers are considerably higher toward the end of the sample period. For example, if we only 
consider years after 2001 the average annual reported pension liability is about $2.5 trillion and the liability 
increases to over $4 trillion when discounted at the Treasury yields. 
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For each of these states, the average pension liability exceeds $100 billion and represents more 
than 20% of each state’s GDP. The actuarial value of assets is fairly close to the market value of 
assets. This is expected since the averages of these two values should be fairly close when 
compared over a long sample period. The small difference between actuarial value of assets and 
market value of assets suggests that the understatement of pension funding gaps is largely driven 
by the understatement of pension liabilities, not by the overstatement of pension assets.   
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the main variables. During the sample period, 
states on average invest 53% of their pension assets in equity, 35% in fixed income, 4% in real 
estate, 3% in cash, and the remaining 5% in the other category. We have a maximum of 888 
observations for our regressions analysis.
37
 We find that state sponsored pension funds are 
running deficits during the sample period. The average annual reported funding gap is $915 per 
capita. This number is on average understated by $3,062. Consistent with Table 1, we find that 
the understatement of the funding gaps mainly comes from the understatement of the plan 
liabilities. The average understatement of the pension liability due to the use of discretion is 
$1,246 per capita and the average understatement of liability due to the GASB rules is $1,978 per 
capita. During the sample period the actuarial value of the pension assets is on average smaller 
than the market value, constituting a negative asset overstatement of $163 per capita. However, 
this result is largely due to the market run-up prior to the technology bubble. If we exclude 1998-
2000 from the sample, we find an average asset overstatement of $5 per capita (untabulated).  
After adjusting for midyear spending cuts and tax changes, the average general fund 
deficit is $50 per capita and the average surplus is $28 per capita. Most of the deficits occur 
during the recession periods (i.e., early 90s, after the technology bubble of 2001, and the 
                                                             
37 The state payroll data are from 1992-2010, with 1996 missing. This gives us 900 state-year observations. We lost 
12 observations because West Virginia does not have pension data until 1994, Maine and Tennessee do not have 
pension data until 1996, and Texas does not have total balance data in 1998. 
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financial crisis period of 2008 and 2009) and most of the surpluses occur during the expansion 
period of 1995-2000. The ratio of general fund total balance to total expenditures has an average 
of 9.8%. The average midyear spending cut during the sample period is $15 per capita and the 
average enacted tax change is $5 per capita. 33% of the state-years enforce spending cuts and 
36% of the state-years enact tax increases. We also find that during our sample period, states face 
the harshest fiscal condition in fiscal year 2009. During that year, the average deficit soars to 
$201 per capita, the average tax change is $46 per capita, and the average spending cut is $79 per 
capita (untabulated). The fiscal survey of states published by the NASBO states that fiscal year 
2009 is “one of the worst, if not the worst, fiscal periods since the Great Depression.”38  
A state on average issues short-term debt of $0.092 per capita and long-term debt of $435 
per capita per year. Since most of the states have gubernatorial elections every 4 years, 25% of 
the sample years have a gubernatorial election. Only 6% of the sample years have elections that 
are considered competitive. The average annual state payroll expenditures are about $707 per 
capita and the average total fund balance is about $238 per capita. An average state has a 
population of about 5.7 million and personal income per resident of $30,000. The average 
poverty rate is 12% and the average population density is 184 people per square mile. 
6.2. Pension funding gap understatement and state fiscal conditions 
We first examine whether the extent to which states understate their pension funding gaps 
is associated with their fiscal condition. Table 3 reports the regression results. We find strong 
evidence that a state’s fiscal wellbeing is related to the use of discretion in calculating pension 
liabilities. Column [1] shows that when the dependent variable is LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC, the 
                                                             
38 Since many states experienced unusually high levels of fiscal stress in 2009, we perform sensitivity analysis to 
ensure that all our results related to state fiscal conditions are robust to excluding fiscal year 2009.  
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coefficient on DEFICIT is positive and significant (0.324, t-statistic of 2.873) and the coefficient 
on TTLBAL_RATIO is negative and significant (-3.259, t-statistic of -2.043). The magnitudes of 
the coefficients suggests that a $100 per capita deficit is associated with a $32.4 per capita 
understatement in state pension liabilities and a 1% decrease in the ratio of total fund balance to 
expenditures is associated with $3.3 per capita increase in pension liability understatement. As 
expected, we do not find states manipulating their pension liabilities when they are running 
surpluses. The coefficient on SURPLUS is not significant.  
We also find that states are more likely to understate pension liabilities when they are 
issuing short-term debt during the year, but we do not find any association between long-term 
debt issuance and pension liability understatements. Since states usually use short-term debt to 
finance unexpected budget shortfalls, this result is consistent with our prediction that relieving a 
budget constraint is likely to be the first order consideration related to pension accounting 
manipulation. We also find that when the gubernatorial election is competitive, states are more 
likely to understate their pension liability. 
Columns [2] and [3] show that none of the incentives are related to asset overstatement or 
rule related understatement of pension liability. This result is not surprising given that 
understatement of pension funding gaps is primarily driven by the understatement of liabilities, 
not by the overstatement of assets. In addition, by allowing states to use expected asset returns as 
the discount rates, the GASB rules systematically understate the pension liabilities in both good 
times and bad times. Therefore, it is expected that we find no relation between the rule related 
understatement and the state’s incentives to underreport. 
6.3. Pension funding gap understatement and midyear fiscal adjustments 
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Table 4 presents regression results on the association between the probability of midyear 
tax and spending adjustments and pension funding gap understatement. For presentation 
purposes, we scale the pension variables (LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC, ASSET_OVSTMT, 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE, and GASB_FUNDGAP) to thousands of dollars. Columns [1] and 
[2] show that the coefficient on DEFICIT is positive and significant, which suggests that states 
are more likely to enforce midyear spending cuts and tax increases when they are running 
deficits. We also find that the coefficient on TTLBAL_RATIO is negative and significant, which 
suggests that fiscally sound states (i.e. have a larger balance in the state general account) are less 
likely to have midyear spending cuts or tax increases. The coefficient on SURPLUS is 
insignificant in column [2] but positive and significant in column [1], which suggests that the 
larger the surplus, the less likely the state is to cut spending.
39
    
We find that the effect of fiscal condition on midyear spending cuts and tax increases is 
mitigated by discretion related understatement of the pension liability. Specifically, the 
coefficient on the interaction term DEFICIT*LIAB_UNDERSTMT_DISC is negative and 
significant and the coefficient on TTLBAL_RATIO*LIAB_UNDERSTMT_DISC is positive 
and significant.
40
 We find no evidence that rule related understatement of pension liability and 
pension asset overstatement are associated with the likelihood of midyear fiscal adjustments in 
                                                             
39 Note that SURPLUS equals EXP_MINUS_REV if the variable is smaller or equal to zero and zero otherwise. 
Therefore the larger the surplus, the more negative the SURPLUS variable is.  
40  Ai and Norton (2003) argue that direct interpretation of the interaction term in nonlinear models provides 
incorrect information about the interaction effect. They propose an alternative estimator for the interaction effect in 
nonlinear models. However, Greene (2010) points out that the Ai and Norton measure has a different point estimate 
and standard error for every observation in the sample, making it difficult to draw statistical inferences using their 
measure. Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) suggest that the findings in Ai and Norton (2003) result from a mechanical 
saturation effect that arises in link functions that constrain the probability of occurrence to be between 0 and 1. They 
conclude that “in many contexts where researchers are primarily concerned with proportional marginal effects, the 
econometric best practice is to rely on the interaction term coefficient … for interpreting and statistically testing 
interaction effects.”  
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times of fiscal stress. We also do not find that pension understatements are associated with the 
likelihood of fiscal adjustments in times of fiscal wellbeing.  
To examine the economic significance of pension understatements, we calculate the 
marginal effects of state fiscal conditions on the likelihood of a spending cut or tax increase after 
moving LIAB_UNDERSTMT_DISC across its interquartiles and setting all the other variables at 
their mean values. We find that, for an average state with a $100 per capita deficit, moving the 
discretion related understatement of the pension liability from the 25th to the 75th percentile 
decreases the probability of a spending cut by 0.028 and the probability of a tax increase by 
0.032, both of which represent a reduction in the probabilities of about 31%.
41
 Given that the 
unconditional probability of a spending cut or tax increase is about 0.3 (see Table 2), these 
effects are economically significant.  
Our predictions focus on whether midyear spending cuts and tax increases are less likely 
for states that understate their pension. Therefore, a logit model is the appropriate research 
design choice.
42
 There are also econometric reasons why logit is the preferred approach. First, 
spending changes are right censored because while states may enact tax changes (either increase 
taxes or decrease taxes) after the budget passes, increases in appropriations outside of the usual 
appropriation cycle are less common and the NASBO does not provide such data. In addition, 
since midyear fiscal adjustments do not happen often, the data contains a significant number of 
zeros,
43
 and an OLS specification is likely to yield biased coefficients (Wooldridge, 2002). 
                                                             
41 For an average state with LIAB_UNDERSTMT_DISC at the 25th percentile, a $100 per capita deficit is associated 
with a 0.089 (0.103) probability of spending cut (tax increase). For an average state with 
LIAB_UNDERSTMT_DISC at the 75th percentile, a $100 per capita deficit is associated with a 0.061 (0.071) 
probability of spending cut (tax increase). Therefore, an interquartile change in LIAB_UNDERSTMT_DISC 
reduces the association between deficits and the probability of spending cut (tax increase) by 0.028 (0.032), which is 
about 31% decrease in the probability of a spending cut or tax increase (0.028/0.089, 0.032/0.103).  
42 We find similar results under a probit model.  
43 67% of the state years have 0 midyear spending cuts, and 26% of the state years have 0 midyear tax changes.  
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Nonetheless, in untabulated analysis we test whether our results are sensitive to this 
particular choice by using an OLS model. An OLS model tests whether the magnitude of tax 
change (ΔTAX) or spending cut change (ΔOUTLAY) is associated with the magnitude of the 
pension understatement. We find weaker results when using ΔOUTLAY and ΔTAX as the 
dependent variables. Specifically, the coefficient on DEFICIT*LIAB_UNDERSTMT_DISC is 
negative and significant [t-statistic of -1.86] when ΔOUTLAY is the dependent variable, but 
negative and insignificant [t-statistic of -1.19] when ΔTAX is the dependent variable. In 
addition, the coefficient on TTLBAL_RATIO*LIAB_UNDERSTMT_DISC is positive and 
significant only at one tailed 10% level in the ΔOUTLAY regression [t-statistic of 1.520] and 
becomes insignificant in the ΔTAX regression [t-statistic of 0.604]. 
We perform additional robustness tests on the measurement of the fiscal condition 
variables. We calculate the DEFICIT and SURPLUS variables using revenues and expenditures 
recorded under a state’s general fund, which is the key governmental fund as it holds almost all 
tax and fee collections and is used to pay recurring expenditures. Given that pension 
contributions are required annual expenditures, they are likely to be general fund expenditures.
44
 
This complicates our analysis because ideally we would like to measure a state’s deficit status 
without any pension discretion and investigate whether pension discretion mitigates the effect of 
fiscal condition on midyear adjustments. However, this design is empirically challenging 
because we do not have nor do we know where to get the data necessary to estimate the 
discretionary component of the annual required contribution.  
To address this issue, we take a conservative approach and exclude the entire reported 
pension contribution from the calculation of the DEFICIT variable. This test only includes 374 
                                                             
44  Private conversation with a NASBO analyst confirms that although NASBO does not give states specific 
instructions to include spending for pension funds in general fund expenditures, most states consider spending for 
pension as a form of general fund spending.  
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observations since we do not have data on pension contributions prior to 2000. In addition, the 
fiscal variables have smaller variation, as now we do not have the expansion period of 1995-
2000. Both factors weaken our results; however, in untabulated analyses we still find the 
coefficient on the interaction term DEFICIT*LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC to be negative and 
significant for both spending cut and tax increase regressions [-0.017 with a t-statistic of -1.84 
and -0.007 with a t-statistic of -2.60, respectively]. This suggests that pension discretion is 
associated with a reduced probability of spending cuts and tax increases when states are running 
budget deficits. 
6.4. Regression results on future payroll expenditures 
6.4.1. Main findings 
  Table 5 presents regression results on the association between pension funding gap 
understatement and future payroll expenditures. We find that future payroll expenditures are 
positively associated with the rule related portion of the understatement, but not the pension asset 
overstatement or the discretion related pension liability understatement. Combining with the 
results in Tables 3 and 4, this suggests that although states use discretion to understate their 
pension liability in response to fiscal stress and to reduce the probability of spending cuts or tax 
increases, this understatement is transparent in nature and state officials do not base their hiring 
decisions on this figure. In contrast, the understatement due to the design of the GASB rule is 
associated with states incurring higher labor costs.  
In columns [2] and [3] we extend the testing window to future 3 and 5 years and find that 
the funding gap understatement has a long-term effect on states labor costs. We find that the 
statistical significance and the magnitude of the coefficient on LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE 
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increase when we extend the testing window to 3 and to 5 years. One potential explanation is that 
state officials may take into account the past few years’ estimated employee costs in their hiring 
decisions, so it takes time for the understatement to fully materialize. It is also possible that a 
new position takes time to be filled, and therefore, it takes time for the employment level to 
adjust.
45
  
The magnitude of the coefficient on LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE suggests that a $1,000 per 
capita understatement due to the high discount rate allowed under the GASB rule is associated 
with a per capita increase of $11 in public employee payrolls in the next 3 to 5 years. Given the 
average population during the sample period is about 5.7 million and the average rule related 
liability understatement is $1,978 per capita (see Table 2), the coefficients suggest that an 
average state spends an extra $125 million on hiring future employees due to the inherent 
methodology in the GASB rules.   
Column [1] shows that the reported funding gap (GASB_FUNDGAP) is only weakly 
associated with next year’s payroll expenditures (p-value = 0.06, one-tailed), and the variable 
becomes insignificant when we extend the window to future 3 and 5 years (columns [2] & [3]). 
These results suggest that states with larger reported funding gaps may spend more on 
employment in the short term, but that over time, these states respond to the reported funding 
gaps and reduce labor costs. 
Regarding the control variables, we find that states in good fiscal conditions tend to 
increase spending on payrolls, as indicated by a positive and significant coefficient on 
TTLBAL.
46
 States with high per capita income and low poverty rate spend more on public 
                                                             
45 Using a long lag to allow employment to adjust to its new equilibriums is common in labor economics research. 
For example, Poterba and Rueben (1995) use a ten-year lag to study the effects of property tax limits on wages and 
employment of local governments.   
46 Our results are robust when we scale total balances by general fund expenditures.  
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workers, consistent with the idea that the demand for public services increases with citizen 
income. We also find that densely populated states spend more on their employees and more 
populated states spend less.
47
 These results are in general consistent with prior studies.  
We control for state heterogeneity and time effects by including state and year fixed 
effects. Our results are stronger both in terms of coefficient magnitude and statistical significance 
if we remove these fixed effects. For example, the coefficient on LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE is 
0.017 (t-statistic of 2.13) for T+1, 0.021 (t-statistic of 2.43) for T+3, and 0.024 (t-statistic of 
2.70) for T+5. All the other pension variables (GASB_FUNDGAP, LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC, 
ASSET_OVSTMT) remain insignificant across testing windows. The inclusion of state and year 
fixed effects also leads to high explanatory power of the model. The adjusted R
2
 is above 97% 
across specifications, leaving little variation unexplained. However, even after removing the state 
and time dummies, the model still explains above half of the variation, a number that is high for 
a spending regression of this nature.
48
 
One potential explanation for the positive association between pension understatement 
and future labor costs is that interest groups, such as unions, pressure state officials to increase 
hiring or compensation.
49
 We examine this possibility by investigating whether the effect of 
pension understatement on future labor costs is larger for more heavily unionized states. We 
collect public employee union membership data from unionstats.gsu.edu, which compiled the 
data from the Current Population Survey (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2003). We consider a state 
heavily unionized (UNION = 1) if its median public employee union membership is above the 
sample median. We then allow the coefficients on the pension variables in equation (3) to vary 
                                                             
47  The negative relation between population and payroll expenditure is likely mechanical because the payroll 
expenditure is measured in per capita. Our results are similar if we replace population with population growth.  
48 For example, the spending regression in Masusaka (2009) includes regional dummies, but only explains about one 
quarter of the variation. 
49 We thank the editor for this suggestion.  
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based on UNION by including the following interaction terms: GASB_FUNDGAP*UNION, 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC*UNION, ASSET_OVSTMT*UNION, and 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE*UNION.
50
  
In untabulated results, we find that the association between the pension funding gap 
understatements and future labor costs is attributable to heavily unionized states. Specifically, the 
coefficient on LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE is not significant across testing windows, which 
suggests that for weakly unionized states, rule related pension understatements do not drive up 
future labor costs. In contrast, the sum of the coefficients on LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE and 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE*UNION is positive and significant across the testing windows and 
the effect is stronger in the long term.
51
 These results are largely consistent with the explanation 
that powerful unions may be one contributing factor that drives up future labor costs when 
pension costs are understated.   
Overall, Table 5 shows that pension funding gap understatements are associated with 
higher future labor spending. We find that this result is primary attributable to rule related and 
not discretion related understatements. We also find that states adjust their future hiring in 
response to reported funding gaps. Jointly these results seem more consistent with the 
interpretation that pension funding gap understatements make it more difficult for state officials 
to fully understand the true cost of their employees with the result that they invest more in labor. 
However, we also note that we cannot completely rule out the explanation that funding gap 
                                                             
50 Note that since the model has state fixed effects, it is not necessary to include the main effect of UNION.  
51 For T+1, the sum of the coefficients on LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE and LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE*UNION is 
positive, but not significant (p-value = 0.157). The sum of the coefficients is positive and significant at conventional 
levels for T+3 and T+5 (0.010, p-value = 0.057; 0.011, p-value = 0.020). The coefficient on the interaction term 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE*UNION is positive and significant for T+3 and T+5 (0.013, t-statistic of 2.09; 0.016, t-
statistic of 2.77). 
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understatements leave more funds available in the state’s budget that can then be spent on 
employment.  
6.4.2 Additional analyses and robustness checks 
 In Table 6 we use a change model to explore whether increases in funding gap 
understatement are associated with increases in future labor costs. The dependent variable is the 
next n year change in labor expenditures, where n = 1, 3, or 5. The variables of interest are the 
lagged n year change in pension variables.
52
 Since we are taking the differences in our variables, 
we drop state fixed effects. Consistent with Table 5, we find that it is mainly the changes in rule 
related understatement of pension liabilities that are associated with future increases in payroll 
spending and this effect is larger in the long term. The coefficient on 
ΔLIAB_UNDERSTMT_RULE is positive and significant across columns [1]–[3] and the 
magnitude of the coefficient increases across the testing windows. We do not find changes in 
discretion related understatement to be associated with future changes in payroll spending. 
Column [1] also shows that changes in asset overstatement and changes in the reported funding 
gap may be associated with short-term changes in payroll spending. However, these associations 
disappear once we extend the testing window to longer periods.  
We conduct a set of robustness tests that we summarize here without tabulation. To 
ensure that our results are not driven by a specific discount rate, we rerun the analyses using the 
Aa corporate bond rates and taxable state GO bond yields as alternative rates to measure the rule 
related understatement in pension liabilities. We discuss how we collect the data on these rates in 
Appendix C. Consistent with the results above, we find that when we measure the rule related 
                                                             
52 For example, when n = 3, we examine whether the change in pension variables from T-3 to T is related to the 
change in payroll expenditures from T to T+3.  
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understatement using the Aa corporate bond rates, the understatement in pension liabilities due to 
the GASB methodology is positively associated with long-term labor costs. Specifically, 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE is positively related to state payroll expenditures in the next 3–5 
years. In the short-term, LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE is still positively related to payroll 
expenditures. However, the statistical significance is reduced (t-statistic of 1.563).  
 We find weaker results when we take into account the riskiness of the state and measure 
the rule related understatement using the taxable state GO bond rates. Although 
LIAB_UNDERSTMT_RULE is still positively related to future payroll provisions and the 
magnitude of the coefficient is larger in the long run (3-5 years in the future), the statistical 
significance of the variable drops.
53
 The weaker results are likely due to potentially large 
measurement error in implied state GO bond yields, because the majority of the states do not 
have observable GO bond yields and we need to use rating implied yield curves to proxy for 
their GO bond yields (see discussion in Appendix C). Regardless of the discount rates, we do not 
find reported funding level, discretion related understatement of pension liability, and 
overstatement of plan assets related to long term labor spending.  
We further investigate whether our results are sensitive to the expected investment return 
assumptions used to calculate the discretion-free GASB discount rate. Specifically, we estimate 
inter-temporal differences in the expected investment return by looking at the annual change in 
the average nominal expected return assumption for corporate pension plans.
54
 We follow this 
approach because both public and corporate plans use similar methodologies to set the expected 
                                                             
53 The coefficient on LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE is 0.013 (t-statistic of 1.70) for year T+3 and 0.014 (t-statistic of 
1.54) for year T+5.  
54 We calculate the average disclosed discount rate for corporate plans with assets in excess of $10 million for each 
year in our sample period. On average, there were approximately 4,000 plans per year. The average rate was level 
during the early 1990’s, it increased approximately 15 basis points from 1995 through 1999, and it then decreased 
approximately 40 basis points from 2000 through the end of our sample period. Overall, the average inflation-
adjusted discretion-free GASB discount rate is 7.1%, which is 20 basis points higher than the original pre-
adjustment rate of 6.8% (see Table 2). 
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return on assets.
55
 However, the return assumption for corporate plans for ERISA reporting 
purposes is set by the plan actuary, and not by the firm itself, thus mitigating the potential use of 
discretion. Our intuition is that if the average annual nominal assumption for private pension 
plans decreases by a certain amount, then we would expect public pension plans to decrease by 
the same amount. Our results are not sensitive to using this alternative discretion-free GASB rate. 
Specifically, we still find that the rule related understatement of pension liabilities is positively 
associated with future payroll expenditures and that this association is stronger in the longer term 
window (3 and 5 years). The magnitude of the coefficient is also similar to our original results. 
We do not find any association between future labor spending and discretion related 
understatement of pension liabilities or overstatement of pension assets. 
Finally, we rerun the analysis using the least absolute deviations (LAD) estimation to 
ensure that our results are not sensitive to outliers. Since the LAD estimator minimizes the sum 
of the absolute deviation of the residuals, LAD gives less weight to large residuals than OLS, 
rendering it more robust to outliers than OLS (Greene, 2002). Our results hold under LAD.  
Although we find evidence that states’ accounting choices on pension reporting are 
related to fiscal conditions, decisions to enforce midyear fiscal adjustments, and future labor 
spending, we emphasize that our results do not allow us to draw any causal inferences. As 
mentioned above, all the fiscal actions in response to a budget shortfall are simultaneously 
determined and we do not have a setting to tease out the effect solely attributable to pension 
understatements. Even though we use a long lead and lag to investigate how current pension 
                                                             
55 The expected return assumption is typically calculated based on the combination of the expected price inflation 
and the long-term expected real rate of return on assets. Since the long-term expected real rate of return on assets has 
small variation over time, changes in the expected return assumption capture changes in expected price inflation. 
This adjustment is based on the assumption that, on average, private plans do not change their asset allocations over 
time. We believe this is a reasonable assumption given that we are averaging around 4,000 plans per year.  
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understatement relates to future labor spending, the design still does not allow us to establish 
causality. Therefore, we caution the interpretation of our results.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether governmental entities make accounting choices that are 
associated with fiscal stress and whether there are economic outcomes associated with those 
decisions. We find that states’ discretion to understate pension funding gaps is associated with 
periods of fiscal stress and that understated funding gaps are negatively associated with the 
likelihood of tax increases and expenditure cuts. We also find that pension understatements are 
associated with higher future labor costs. Importantly, we find that the positive relation between 
pension funding gap understatement and future labor costs is associated with the inherent 
methodology in the GASB rules, which systematically understate the funding gap, and is not 
associated with opportunistic reporting by state governments.  
Our results should be of interest to governments and policymakers, as they have 
important implications for the current direction of the GASB pension reporting regime. GASB 
recently issued Statements 67 and 68 that replace Statements 25 and 27. The new standards are 
intended to improve financial reporting transparency by requiring the disclosure of a substantial 
amount of information not required in the old regime. In addition, the new standards require that 
state and local governments use a single discount rate that combines both a funding approach 
(long-term expected rate of return on plan assets) and a liability approach (high rated municipal 
bond yields).
56
 While this is a move toward the FASB approach, it is only a partial one, as the 
                                                             
56 There are two parts to the calculation of the pension liability under the new standards. The first part is the present 
value of future benefit payments that can be paid out of current pension assets. These future benefit payments are 
discounted using the expected rate of return on the pension assets, consistent with the prior standards. The second 
part is the present value of future benefit payments that cannot be paid out of current pension assets. These future 
benefit payments are discounted using a high-quality municipal bond interest rate. Critics argue that this blended 
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new pension accounting standards will continue to systematically understate the funding gap, 
albeit on a reduced scale. This is noteworthy, since our results suggest that the funding approach 
is associated with states committing to additional expenditures. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
rate solution still leaves room for employers to hide the true extent of underfunding and could incentivize states to 
increase investment in risky assets or “chase yield.” (see for example, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/29/usa-pensions-sec-idUSL1N0OF1E220140529).  
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Appendix A 
Duration Estimation  
 
Our research design requires that we re-estimate each state’s pension liabilities using alternative 
discount rates. To facilitate these calculations, we estimate the duration of each state’s pension liability. 
Duration is a measure of the weighted average time over which benefit payments are made from the plan. It 
provides an effective approach to adjusting the pension liability to reflect different discount rates. In particular, 
a pension plan with a duration of 15 years will experience a 15% increase in the pension liability for a 1% 
reduction in the discount rate. We estimate the duration by first estimating each state’s total pension liability, 
and then measuring the change in our estimate when we adjust the discount rate by 1%. To estimate a state’s 
total pension liability, we use an aggregate actuarial method based on a single hypothetical participant whose 
characteristics reflect those of the plan as a whole. In this case, the pension liability for the entire plan is simply 
the pension liability for this participant. The aggregate method is commonly used to estimate pension liabilities 
for both public and private pension plans. When properly applied, the pension valuation under both the 
individual and aggregate approaches produces virtually identical results.  
We estimate the pension liability separately for the active and inactive participants. For the active 
participants, we need three distinct groups of items for the calculation: information about the participants, 
information that relates to the benefit formula, and information on the specific actuarial assumptions. We collect 
information on the total pay, average service and average age of all the active participants to identify the 
attributes of the hypothetical employee for purposes of applying the aggregate cost method. We use the benefit 
multiplier from the plan provisions to determine the size of the retirement benefit. We use the actuarial 
assumptions for the discount rate, the salary growth assumption, the retiree cost of living adjustment (COLA), 
and the average retirement date to determine the value of this retiree benefit. For the inactive participants we 
follow the same approach, except that our hypothetical inactive participant is determined using the total benefit 
payments (rather than total pay).  
We compare our estimated pension liability with the reported amount for each state in our sample and 
find that the difference is within 10 percent. This result suggests that our approach is reasonable and that the 
estimate of the duration we derive from our liability estimates is reliable.  
 
 43 
Appendix B 
Variable Definitions 
ASSET_OVSTMT = Per capita overstatement of pension assets; 
  
COMP = 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the gubernatorial election is defined as a 
competitive election and 0 otherwise. We consider a gubernatorial election to be 
competitive if the vote for the winning candidate is between 48% to 52%;  
  
EXP_MINUS_REV = 
The difference between adjusted general fund expenditures and adjusted general 
fund revenues. Adjusted general fund expenditures are the reported 
expenditures in the general fund plus any midyear spending cuts. Adjusted 
general fund revenues are the reported revenues in the general fund minus any 
enacted tax changes during the fiscal year. A DEFICIT (SURPLUS) occurs 
when adjusted general fund expenditures exceed (are less than) adjusted general 
fund revenues;  
  
SURPLUS = 
EXP_MINUS_REV if the variable is smaller or equal to zero, and zero 
otherwise;  
  
DEFICIT = EXP_MINUS_REV if the variable is greater than zero, and zero otherwise;  
    
DENSITY = The number of residents per square mile; 
  
DSPENDCUT = 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state government enacts midyear spending 
cuts during the fiscal year and 0 otherwise; 
  
DTAXINCREASE = 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state government enacts tax increases during 
the fiscal year and 0 otherwise; 
  
ELECTION = 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is a gubernatorial election year and 0 
otherwise; 
    
GASB_FUNDGAP = 
Per capita reported pension funding gap, where pension funding gap is defined 
as reported plan liabilities minus reported plan assets;  
  
ISSUE_LTD = Per capita long-term debt issuance; 
  
ISSUE_STD = Per capita short-term debt issuance; 
  
LnPI = Natural logarithm of state personal income per capita; 
    
PAYROLL =  Per capita annualized total payroll expenditures; 
    
POVERTY =  State poverty rate reported by Census Bureau; 
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POPULATION = State population (in thousands); 
    
TTLBAL = 
Per capita total fund balance, where total fund balance is the sum of the general 
fund balance and the rainy day fund balance; 
    
TTLBAL_RATIO = The ratio of total fund balance to total expenditures in the general fund; 
  
TTL_UNDSTMT = Per capita total understatement of pension funding gap; 
  
LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC = 
Per capita understatement of pension liabilities as a result of the use of 
discretion; 
    
LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE =  
Per capita understatement of pension liabilities as a result of the design of the 
GASB rules; 
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Appendix C 
Data Collection on Aa Corporate Rates and Taxable State GO Bond Yields 
We use the Citigroup Pension Discount Curve, which we download from the Society of Actuaries 
website, to estimate the appropriate Aa corporate bond rate. The Citigroup Pension Discount Curve uses a 
specific mathematically generated Aa yield curve and is designed specifically to meet the requirements of SFAS 
87. More information on this yield curve is provided in Naughton (2014).  
We collect the state general obligation bond yield from Bloomberg. We obtained state specific general 
obligation bond yield curves for 20 states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.). For the remaining 30 states, we collect their general 
obligation bond credit ratings from the Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract of the United States and then use 
these credit ratings’ corresponding yield curves from Bloomberg to proxy for the states’ general obligation bond 
yield curves. Bloomberg only has general obligation bond yield curves for AAA, AA+, AA-, A+, A-, and BBB. 
We interpolate between the AA+ and AA- curves to obtain an AA curve, and between A+ and A- curves to 
attain an A curve.  
We match the actuarial valuation dates to the most recent general obligation bond yields. All the general 
obligation bond yields are collected either on June 30 or December 31. For plans with their actuarial valuation 
dates between January 1 and June 29, we use the general obligation bond yields on December 31 of the prior 
year. For plans with their actuarial valuation dates between June 30 and December 30, we use the general 
obligation bond yields on June 30 of the same year. For plans with their actuarial valuation dates on December 
31, we use the general obligation bond yields on the same date. Following Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011), we 
assume a 25% marginal personal tax rate and calculate the taxable state general obligation bond rate by dividing 
each state’s general obligation bond rate by (1-25%). This calculation is to remove the tax exempt premium 
associated with the municipal bond yields. Due to data restrictions, our sample is smaller when using the state 
GO bond yields to calculate the pension liabilities.
57
 
 
  
                                                             
57 Bloomberg does not provide data on state yield curves until 1994. Not all states have ratings available in the 1990s. In the regression 
analysis, we drop 6 states (Colorado, Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota) that do not have bond ratings in the 1990s. 
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Figure 1: Composition of Pension Funding Gap Understatement 
 
This figure presents the components of pension funding gap understatement.  
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Table 1: Reported and Estimated Pension Liabilities and Pension Assets by State 
 
This table presents each state’s average annual pension liabilities as reported and as estimated using the discretion-free GASB 
discount rates and the Treasury yields, as well as each state’s average annual actuarial and market value of pension assets. The 
amounts are in billions.  
 
  Pension Liabilities Pension Assets 
State 
Reported  
Discounted at 
Discretion-free Rates 
Discounted at 
Treasury Yields 
Actuarial Value  Market Value  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Alabama 23.33 30.94 36.28 20.97 20.29 
Alaska 9.50 11.38 13.60 7.91 8.76 
Arizona 21.88 25.45 33.26 21.18 20.77 
Arkansas 10.96 13.02 16.90 10.07 9.79 
California 272.58 325.43 412.16 253.91 266.90 
Colorado 25.50 30.75 42.43 21.23 19.73 
Connecticut 24.27 29.69 36.03 14.91 15.97 
Delaware 3.86 4.69 5.92 4.01 4.26 
Florida 75.56 87.04 112.27 73.76 78.27 
Georgia 32.06 36.15 46.26 30.38 30.09 
Hawaii 10.06 11.89 14.78 7.72 7.77 
Idaho 6.30 7.41 9.39 5.71 5.85 
Illinois 80.10 97.27 122.13 52.43 52.90 
Indiana 20.65 26.04 27.95 12.89 12.93 
Iowa 14.22 15.87 19.71 12.94 13.58 
Kansas 10.76 12.96 17.29 8.02 8.55 
Kentucky 23.84 28.34 33.93 20.12 19.59 
Louisiana 22.74 27.69 33.81 14.86 15.57 
Maine 10.38 11.98 15.60 7.76 7.49 
Maryland 29.32 31.99 40.12 24.73 24.13 
Massachusetts 33.84 41.32 56.49 25.16 24.87 
Michigan 49.92 60.57 75.14 43.25 41.81 
Minnesota 31.22 36.45 48.52 27.63 28.56 
Mississippi 16.85 20.15 25.12 12.64 12.84 
Missouri 30.27 37.71 46.56 26.30 26.64 
Montana 5.34 6.51 7.89 4.45 4.23 
Nebraska 4.42 5.53 6.80 3.78 3.84 
Nevada 15.98 20.91 25.02 12.32 16.43 
New Hampshire 3.95 4.96 6.46 2.96 3.42 
New Jersey 70.12 90.09 111.28 60.85 56.66 
New Mexico 15.28 18.38 22.96 12.60 12.45 
New York 165.98 195.85 250.07 169.63 166.68 
North Carolina 44.25 50.18 62.93 45.36 47.86 
North Dakota 2.29 2.79 3.51 2.06 2.16 
Ohio 119.32 143.80 179.30 98.04 104.72 
Oklahoma 16.03 18.96 22.74 9.24 9.56 
Oregon 34.32 39.48 52.68 33.17 33.80 
Pennsylvania 65.07 78.54 100.90 61.80 62.93 
Rhode Island 7.78 9.41 11.87 5.46 5.43 
South Carolina 22.76 30.88 31.12 18.10 18.15 
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South Dakota 4.20 4.85 6.17 3.84 4.26 
Tennessee 26.24 33.86 38.83 24.78 24.67 
Texas 106.51 133.35 163.85 99.08 103.03 
Utah 9.91 12.37 16.76 9.14 10.57 
Vermont 2.06 2.57 3.26 1.75 1.69 
Virginia 32.98 36.28 48.68 29.54 31.18 
Washington 41.69 47.20 66.52 38.28 35.23 
West Virginia 9.01 10.44 12.61 4.38 4.33 
Wisconsin 50.60 57.90 77.05 49.25 51.98 
Wyoming 3.75 4.59 5.95 3.54 3.77 
Total 1,770 2,122 2,677 1,564 1,597 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive information on the variables used in the analysis. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
 N Mean Median Std Dev 
Pension Variables          
Asset allocations (%)         
Equity  984 52.789 55 12.642 
Fixed Income 984 34.941 31.550 14.539 
Real estate 984 4.162 3.643 3.832 
Cash and short term investment 984 2.588 1.750 2.917 
Other 984 5.520 3.846 5.859 
Discount rates & duration         
Reported  984 0.080 0.08 0.004 
Estimated based on asset allocations 984 0.068 0.069 0.005 
Treasury yields 984 0.059 0.058 0.013 
Aa corporate bond rates 984 0.073 0.074 0.011 
Taxable State GO bond yields 728 0.066 0.065 0.008 
Duration of the plans 984 17.617 17.653 2.066 
Understatement of  pension liability and 
overstatement of pension assets (per capita) 
        
GASB_FUNDGAP 888 914.814 643.016 1065.484 
TTL_UNDSTMT 888 3062.080 2317.469 3180.757 
ASSET_OVSTMT 888 -162.814 -126.952 1015.424 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC 888 1245.843 1150.812 649.015 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE 888 1978.404 1435.265 2525.337 
Other Variables         
DEFICIT (per capita) 776 49.973 0 118.702 
SURPLUS (per capita) 776 -27.776 -1.832 44.479 
Total balance to total expenditures (%) 776 9.833 6.325 15.492 
Midyear spending cuts (per capita) 776 14.661 0 33.492 
Midyear tax changes (per capita) 776 5.308 0 51.313 
DSPENDCUT 776 0.326 0 0.469 
DTAXINCREASE 776 0.363 0 0.481 
Short-term debt issuance (per capita) 776 0.092 0 24.659 
Long-term debt issuance (per capita) 776 434.569 339.788 333.574 
Gubernatorial election  776 0.244 0 0.430 
Gubernatorial election - competitive  776 0.057 0 0.231 
Total payroll expenditure (per capita) 888 707 639 282 
Total balance (per capita) 888 237.836 104.312 786.599 
Personal Income (per capita) 888 30,320 29,856 7,688 
LnPI 888 10.287 10.304 0.256 
Poverty Rate (%) 888 12.363 11.700 3.443 
Population Density 888 184.288 91.191 249.823 
Population (in thousands) 888 5,677 3,948 6,230 
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Table 3: Understatement of Pension Funding Gaps and State Fiscal Conditions 
 
This table presents regression analyses on the pension funding gap understatement and state fiscal conditions. All variables are defined 
in Appendix B.  t-statistics are in brackets and are based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered by state and year. ***, 
**, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
  LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISCt-1 ASSET_OVSTMTt-1 LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULEt-1 
  [1] [2] [3] 
DEFICITt 0.324*** -0.010 -0.222 
  [2.873] [-0.051] [-0.959] 
SURPLUSt 0.072 -0.491 0.569 
  [0.190] [-0.551] [0.539] 
TTLBAL_RATIOt -3.259** -5.927 -0.304 
  [-2.043] [-1.283] [-0.080] 
ISSUE_STD 1.050** -0.695 -0.892 
  [2.080] [-0.908] [-0.667] 
ISSUE_LTD -0.076 -0.069 0.346 
  [-0.804] [-0.456] [1.442] 
ELECTION -27.735 25.591 -96.150 
  [-1.112] [0.468] [-1.179] 
ELECTION*COMP 99.067* -62.073 145.546 
  [1.945] [-0.479] [1.037] 
LnPIt 1,113.969 320.732 -613.954 
  [0.952] [0.208] [-0.162] 
POVERTYt 10.493 -16.683* 9.078 
  [0.753] [-1.961] [0.303] 
DENSITYt 6.190** 4.199 -1.179 
  [2.267] [1.247] [-0.126] 
POPULATIONt -0.118* 0.052 0.023 
  [-1.809] [0.982] [0.091] 
     
State FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 776 776 776 
Adjusted R-squared 0.745 0.536 0.865 
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Table 4: Understatements of Pension Funding Gaps and Midyear Fiscal Adjustments 
 
This table presents regression analyses of midyear spending cuts and tax increases on the pension funding gap understatement and 
state fiscal conditions. All variables are defined in Appendix B. The pension variables (i.e., LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC, 
ASSET_OVSTMT, LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE, and GASB_FUNDGAP) are scaled to thousand dollars per capita for presentation 
purpose. t-statistics are in brackets and are based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered by state and year. ***, **, and 
* represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
  DSPENDCUT DTAXINCREASE 
 [1] [2] 
DEFICIT 0.019*** 0.013** 
  [2.969] [2.507] 
SURPLUS 0.035* 0.001 
  [1.746] [0.066] 
TTLBAL_RATIO -0.277*** -0.129** 
  [-3.320] [-2.160] 
DEFICIT x LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC -0.006*** -0.004** 
  [-2.882] [-2.434] 
SURPLUS x LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC 0.001 0.008 
  [0.032] [1.535] 
DEFICIT x ASSET_OVSTMT -0.001 0.001 
  [-1.146] [0.742] 
SURPLUS x ASSET_OVSTMT -0.002 -0.005 
  [-0.153] [-0.800] 
DEFICIT x LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE -0.001 -0.001 
  [-0.810] [-1.196] 
SURPLUS x LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE -0.003 -0.003 
  [-0.808] [-1.204] 
TTLBAL_RATIO x LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC 0.150*** 0.048** 
  [3.140] [2.489] 
TTLBAL_RATIO x ASSET_OVSTMT 0.012 0.004 
  [1.273] [0.885] 
TTLBAL_RATIO x LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE -0.005 0.001 
  [-1.242] [0.324] 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISC -0.658 0.061 
  [-1.272] [0.201] 
ASSET_OVSTMT -0.019 -0.167 
  [-0.047] [-0.759] 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULE 0.249 -0.098 
  [1.272] [-0.607] 
GASB_FUNDGAP 0.078 0.043 
  [0.225] [0.219] 
LnPI 1.280 2.728 
  [0.277] [0.911] 
POVERTY 0.204* -0.006 
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  [1.881] [-0.072] 
DENSITY -0.008 0.016* 
  [-0.616] [1.692] 
POPULATION 0.000 -0.000 
  [1.119] [-0.600] 
  
  
State FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 776 776 
Pseudo R-squared 0.543 0.285 
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Table 5: Understatements of Pension Funding Gaps and Future State Payroll Expenditures 
 
This table presents regression analysis on pension funding gap understatements and future state payroll expenditures. All variables are 
defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are in brackets and are based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered by state and 
year. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
 Payrollt+n 
 [1] [2] [3] 
  n=1 n=3 n=5 
GASB_FUNDGAPt 0.016 0.009 0.010 
  [1.573] [0.825] [0.929] 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISCt 0.006 0.002 0.001 
  [0.702] [0.212] [0.103] 
ASSET_OVSTMTt 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  [0.194] [-0.351] [0.434] 
LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULEt 0.008* 0.011** 0.011** 
  [1.728] [2.320] [2.401] 
Control variables    
TTLBALt+1 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 
  [8.911] [7.328] [3.972] 
LnPIt+1 578.381*** 624.944*** 635.119*** 
  [4.529] [6.182] [4.953] 
POVERTYt+1 -2.856 -3.685* -5.752*** 
  [-1.639] [-1.763] [-2.866] 
DENSITYt+1 1.280** 1.143* 1.074 
  [2.013] [1.847] [1.577] 
POPULATIONt+1 -0.043*** -0.045*** -0.047*** 
  [-3.276] [-3.288] [-3.002] 
    
State FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 888 789 689 
Adjusted R-squared 0.971 0.972 0.976 
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Table 6: Changes in Understatements of Pension Funding Gaps and Changes in Future State Payroll Expenditures 
 
This presents regression analysis on pension funding gap understatements and future state payroll expenditures using a change model. 
The dependent variable is the next n year change in labor expenditures, where n = 1, 3, or 5. The variables of interest are the lagged n 
year change in pension variables (funding level, rule and discretion based understatements of pension liabilities, and overstatement of 
pension assets). For example, when n = 3, we examine whether the change in pension variables from T-3 to T is related to the change 
in payroll expenditures from T to T+3. All variables are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are in brackets and are based on 
heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered by state and year. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, 
respectively. 
 
 
 ∆Payrollt+n 
 [1] [2] [3] 
  n=1 n=3 n=5 
∆GASB_FUNDGAPt 0.005* -0.000 0.003 
  [1.864] [-0.034] [0.377] 
∆LIAB_UNDSTMT_DISCt 0.005 -0.000 0.008 
  [1.356] [-0.024] [0.883] 
∆ASSET_OVSTMTt 0.003* -0.001 0.001 
  [1.703] [-0.219] [0.136] 
∆LIAB_UNDSTMT_RULEt 0.001* 0.007** 0.014* 
  [1.717] [2.457] [1.848] 
Control variables    
∆TTLBALt+n 2.964 27.701** 26.222*** 
  [0.211] [2.212] [4.673] 
∆LnPIt+n 181.925** 392.295*** 481.347*** 
  [2.286] [5.672] [4.416] 
∆POVERTYt+n -0.831 -3.186*** -5.145** 
  [-1.018] [-3.195] [-2.419] 
∆DENSITYt+n 1.193 1.578* 1.059 
  [0.898] [1.807] [1.566] 
∆POPULATIONt+n -0.039* -0.042*** -0.038*** 
  [-1.893] [-2.692] [-2.812] 
    
State FE NO NO NO 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 789 638 483 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.328 0.313 
 
 
 
